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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
llARBARALYON,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.

HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND
INDEl\lNITY CO~IPANY,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No.
12068

and

INSURANCE
CO:\IPANY,
·Defendant.
YOSE~IITE

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

LEONARD \V. BURNINGHAlH and DAVID

B. DEE, attorneys representing numerous clients
whose interests coincide with the issues herein, were
granted leave by order of the above-entitled Court on
the 31st day of July, 1970 to appear as Amicus Curiae.
For the sake of brevity, the Amicus Curiae accepts
statement of the case and facts as set forth in respondent's Rrief and will limit its discussion to matters which
1
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it feels merit additional consideration to assist the Court
in determinintg the ultimate liability of Appellant to
Respondent.

ARGU~IENT

POINT I
ASSU.NIING THE EXISTENCE OF AN UNINSURED :MOTORIST INSURANCE POLICY
\VITH THE REQUISITE LIABILITY HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED BY A SHO\VING
THAT THE DAMAGES INCURRED 'VERE
THE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGNCE OF AN
UNINSURED MOTORIST AS DEFINED
THEREIN, AN INJURED PARTY SHOULD
BE ENTITLED TO TI-IE BENEFIT OF ALL
AVAILABLE INSURANCE COVERAGE UP
TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS INJURIES.
Recent decisions which have construed standard
form insurance contract clauses which limit uninsured
motorist insurance coverage have held them void as
against the public policy of the respective states
invoked in that their import is to limit the insurer's
liability under the uninsured motorist provisions of
its policy in a manner which is against the avowed
policy expressed in the legislative enactment of required offerings of uninsured motorist coverage. The
leading cases in this area which have struck down
,-arious limiting insurance clauses whether the form

2
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be "prorata", "excess insurance", or "excess-escape"
are Sellers vs. United States Fidelity and Guar11nty Co., 185 So. 2d 689 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1966), Geyer
r. llcscrve Insurance Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 447 P.2d
;jJti ( 1968), and White v. Nationwide IJ;Jutual Insurance Company, 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966).

In Sellers, the specific issue before the Supreme
Court of the State of Florida was whether an automobile
insurance carrier required to provide coverage against
injury by an uninsured motorist in accordance with the
requirements of the Florida Uninsured :Motorist Statute
could deny such coverage on the grounds that the insured had other similar insurance available to him after
having accepted a premium for the uninsured motorist
coverage. The statutory provisions of the State of Florida which require the offering of uninsured motorist
coverage provide that insurance companies must make
available to every prospective insured uninsured motorist coverage in dollar amounts not less than $10,000.00.
The Court held that the insurance carrier could not deny
the insured party the benefit of uninsured motorist coverage on the basis of limiting clauses in its insurance contract where to do so would allow the insurance company
to invalidate the minimum liability coverage set forth in
the Florida statutory provisions. In construing the statute in light of the purpose for which it was enacted, the
Court stated that all clauses in the insurance policy
which were in derogation of the policy behind the statute
n1ust be rejected, and further that said clauses were ineonsistent with the public policy of the state of Florida.
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court reasoned that in all situation where insurance is antilable from one or more insurers, one of
the insurance company's contracts must be violated because ordinarily each contains clauses limiting its availability where other similar insurance exists, with each
company claiming the other's policy to be primary insurance and its own to be secondary. The Court felt that
in light of this necessity, its only alternative was to reject
all clauses of a limiting nature in favor of the insured's
position. The Court's holding is supported by the reasoning in University of J1'lorida Law Review 4, at 455. The
Court concluded by stating:

"It is further our view that the statute does not
intend that an insured shall pyramid coverages
under separate automobile policies so as to re·
cover more than his actual bodily injury, loss
or damage. By way of illustration, if his loss
amounts to $30,000.00 because of bodily injury
inflicted upon him by an uninsured motorist, we
see no reason why, if he is the beneficiary of three
automobile liability insurance policies, he may
not recover the maximum allowed under each
policy." 185 So. 2d at 692.
Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Co., supra, a 1968 case
handed down by the Supreme Court of the state of
Arizona, supports the reasoning of Sellers and the posi·
tion of the respondent in the case at bar. In Geyer, plain·
tiff was a passenger in a vehicle which was involved in
an accident with an uninsured vehicle. The vehicle in
which plaintiff was riding was covered by a $10,000.00
liability insurance policy and a $10,000.00 uninsured
4
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motorist policy, both of which included plaintiff in the
c\·ent injuries resulted due to the negligence of the
11\\ ucr of the vehicle and/ or an uninsured motorist. The
sole question before the Court was if both the driver of
the vehicle plaintiff was riding in and the uninsured motorist were at fault, could plaintiff recover up to the limits
of both insurance policies, provided her injuries were, in
fact, $20,000.00 or in excess thereof. The Court held
plaintiff could recover up to the limits of both policies
if the driver of the vehicle and the uninsured motorist
were both at fault . .I.llit.9ourt stated that th_~ i11s~was
r~~Q.Jhe insured up ta ber__total legal damages
s~h coverage did noteffect a doubl~_J.:e~.9.Y~1'Y
in favor of th@ insu~ed. This conclusion is supported by
the reasoning set forth in the Sellers case, supra.
The position of the Florida Supreme Court and the
~\.rizona Supreme Court set forth in the two decisions
hereinabove ref erred to is supported by White v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, supra. In that
case, the .Fourth Circuit Court stated that clauses in the
insurance company's policies which limit the insurance
company's liability should be applied to limit and reduce
the damages of the insured or injured party, but not the
exposure of the insurer. The Court further stated that
to reduce the liability of the insurer on the basis of "exeess' or "other insurance" clauses when the injuries of
the insured exceed all available insurance coverage, was
against public policy.
The

avffwecl

purpose for the enactment of the Utah
5
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Uninsured l\Iotorist Statute, Section 41-12-21.1, UCA
( 1953) , is to give people carrying such coverage protection from those who cause injury but because of their
uninsured status, are not able to compensate the insured
party. This Court has heretofore held that it must consider the purpose of the entire act when construing a
statute and that it
attempt to promote the intent of
the legislature in its application. Western Au.to Tran~.
port v. Reese, 104 Utah 393, 140 P.2d 348 (1960).

'vill

This Court stated in J.llartin v. Christensen, ~2 Utah
2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 ( 1969), that ordinarily, the lan·
guage in an insurance contract is to be given its plain,
,common meaning. However, this Court has held that
:where ambiguity exists, the contract will be strictly construed against the insurer so as to give the insured the
broadest protection he could have reasonably believed
the terms of the insurance contract afforded him. P. E. '
Ashton v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306 (1965).
The insurer, by its own argument set forth in Appellant's
Brief, admits that it is guaranteeing the insured a maximum amount of insurance, in this case $20,000.00. The
statutory provisions in Section 41-12-21.l specifically
state that the insured shall receive a minimum of
$10,000.00 in uninsured motorist coverage. The insurance contract of the appellant as written offers the respondent not a minimum amount of insurance written in
the face value of the policy, but a maximum amount of
insurance by limiting its liability to respondent as a
secondary type of insurance, and then only if the policy
limits of its insured exceed those of all other available

6
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insurance. Certainly this Court cannot be persuaded
that what the respondent thought she was buying was a
maximum amount of insurance, regardless of who was
at fault in the event an accident occurred. Any individual purchasing insurance in his narrowest belief would
expect that his own insurance coverage was his minimum, and not his maximum, to be added to any other
insurance which was available in the event an accident
occurred in which he was not at fault. Based upon the
underlying purpose for the enactment of the Utah Uninsured Motorist Statute and the reasoning set forth by
this Court in Joyner, supra, the clauses in appellant's
insurance contract which limit its liability should be
struck down as void and against the public policy of the
state of Utah.
This Court struck down similar provisions of an in'iUrance contract when uninsured motorist coverage was
al issue in Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insur ..
ance Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965). The
Court stated:
''The insured of not required to read, nor tb-,
understand, nor to sign anything, but only to pay .
his premium. The practical reality is that the lay
purchaser is in an inferior bargaining positio
and simply accepts unilaterally the policy as prepared by the company." 16 Utah 2d at 229.
The Courts have struck down clauses in insurance
policies which limit the liability of the insurer on the
grounds of public policy, but the cases set out above also
~11ppurt the proposition that to allow the insurance com-

7
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panies to limit their liability by way of contract where
uninsured motorist statutes require a minimum amourn
of coverage, is to allow the insurers to act in derogation
of the statutory language. The Utah statute requires a
minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage to be
offered to the insured in a dollar amount no less than
$10,000.000. Therefore, since the clauses in the insurance contract of appellant attempt to reduce that minimum required amount, they should be struck down. This
Utah statute is remedial in nature, and where the appellant, as in this case, was required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to the insured and to collect a premium
for said coverage in the amount of $20,000.00, it should
not be allowed to limit its liability by any clauses in its
contract. It is respectfully submitted that if these clauses
in appellant's insurance contract are to be given effect,
this Court should follow the reasoning set out in White,
supra, and hold that such clauses should be applied to
limit and reduce the damages of the insured, but not the
exposure of the insurer.
Appellant's policy states that it shall be responsible
to the insured for "all legal liability" of the uninsured
motorist, and as such, the contract should be read in a
light most favorable to the insured. Giving effect to
appellant's insurance policy clauses which limit its liability would create a windfall in favor of appellant at
the ~xpense of respondent. Therefore, appellant should
be liable to respondent for the total face amount of its
uninsured motorist coverage without any setoff. In no
case, however, should appellant be liable to respondent
8
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for less than $10,000.00 without setoff for medical payments coverage, because such would be to alter the
~tatutory provisions of the Utah Uninsured l\Iotorist
Statute which must be considered a part of every policy
of uninsured motorist coverage. See Geyer, supra.
Appellant relies on this Court's language in il'lartin
v. Christensen, supra. In that case, this Court stated that
the clauses in an insurance company's contract must be
given effect and upheld unless such holding would be
against the public policy of this state. This writer submits that where the total damages to respondent far exced all available insurance coverage, and where appellant's insurance policy is in direct contradiction to the
statutory language of the Utah Uninsured l\Iotorist
Statute, this Court should hold that the clauses in appellant's policy which limit its liability are null and void
as against the public policy of this state. The Christensen case, in other particular points relied upon by appellant, is not material to the issues of the case at bar because no statute was involved and the holding of this
Court therein did not violate any recognized public
policy of the state of Utah.
POINT II
AN INSURER'S LIABILITY UNDER UNINSUH.ED lVIOTORIST PROVISIONS OF ITS
INSURANCE CONTRACT SHOULD NOT BE·
REDUCED BY SUBROGATION RIGHTS ACQPIHED PURSUANT TO THE "MEDICAL
9
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PAY..)lENT COVERAGE" PROVISIONS OF
ITS POLICY.
In Phoenix Insurance Company v. Kincaid, 199 So.
2d 770 (Fla. App., 1967) , the Court had under consi<l·
eration an off set provision similar to the one contained
in the case at bar. In Kincaid, the insurer was attempting to set off payments it had made to the claimant under the uninsured motorist endorsement of that same
policy. The Court held that the clause in the insurer's
contract which in effect permitted such setoff was void
and against public policy, because the Florida statute
(see Section 627.0851, F.S.A.) required uninsured motorist coverage in not less than a certain minimum
amount. The endorsement permitting the setoff of medical pay benefits against amounts payable under the uninsured motorist coverage would have had the effect of
reducing the statutory minimum coverage below that
prescribed by the legislature, thus violating the established public policy of the state. In Geyer~ supra, the
Supreme Court of the state of Arizona made the same
observations with respect to setoff claims by the insurer
against payments due under the uninsured motorist proYisions of its policy. The Court stated that to allow the
insurer to set off payments made pursuant to medical
payments provisions against payments due and owing
as a result of uninsured motorist coverage in the_~a.!lle·
-~vould be against the public policy of the state of
Arizona. It further stated that the insurer cannot reduce the minimum coverage as set forth in the Arizona
State Statute by setoff clauses or subrogation provisions.
10
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1

--See also Southeast l~urniture Company and the State
Jnsnrance Fund v. Dean L. Barrett and the Industrial
Commission of lltah, .... Utah 2d .... , 465 P.2d 346
(1970).

Appellant argues that the contractual provisions of
its insurance contract are clear and unambiguous, but
this writer is of the opinion that appellant's insurance
contract should be construed in light of the policies expounded by this Court in Joyner and Barnhart, supra.
Appellant should not be allowed to plead the position of acceptance of two- premiums for two different
types of insurance coverage for the benefit of the in'.iured, and then claim against the proceeds of the insurance policy as a third party beneficiary to the detriment
and expense of the insured. The public policy of the state
of lJ tah as expressed in the enactment of the Utah Uninsured ~Iotorist Statute by our legislature should be
upheld by this Court and appellant should be denied any
setoff pursuant to its subrogation provisions of its in~urance contract against funds due and owing respondent as a result of the uninsured motorist coverage in dispute herein.

POINT III
IF AN INSURER IS ALLU\VED TO SET
OFF' PAYMENTS MADE PURSUANT TO ITS
"MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE" PRO\'ISIONS OF ITS POLICY AGAINST FUNDS
1

11
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DUE AND O\VING AS A RESULT OF U~IN
SCRED MOTORIST COVERAGE, THEN THE
INSURER SHOULD BE LIABLE TO TJIE INSURED FOR A REASONABLE ATTOUNEY'S
FEE.
The general rule in the state of Utah as espoused
by this Court is that attorney's fees are not collectible in
a legal action unless done so pursuant to contract or unless authorized by statute. This writer is of the opinion
that an insurer should be liable for a reasonable attorney's fee in all subrogation matters where liability is
contested, but if that is not the present view of this
Court, it should certainly be the rule of law in the state
of Utah with respect to setoff against payments made
pursuant to uninsured motorist provisions of an insurer's
policy.
In Feltonv. Finley, 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899
( 1949), the Supreme Court of Idaho awarded attorney's
fees to an attorney who had prosecuted a will contest for
a partial number of the heirs of a decedent against nonparticipating heirs of the decedent when the latter heirs
yoluntarily accepted the benefits of the attorney's work
by accepting additional sums of money. During the pen·
dency of the legal action, the heirs of the decedent who
were not participating in the suit ref used to cooperate
with the contesting heirs in any manner whatsoever and
refused to be responsible for any facet of the lawsuit, in·
eluding payment of a reasonable attorney's fee. The
Court held that the attorney was not undertaking the
12
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work gratuitiously and that since the benefits of his work
were accepted voluntarily by each nonparticipating heir,
each was liable to the attorney for a reasonable attorney's
fee. The Court stated:

"The rule is well established that the acceptance of the services rendered by an attorney may
raise an implied promise to pay therefor, which
will supply the place of a contract of employment. If an attorney renders valuable services,
as in the case at bar, to one who has received the
benefit therefor, a promise to pay the reasonable
value of such services is presumed unless th,e
circumstances establish the fact that such services
wel'e intended to be gratuitous". 209 P.2d at 901.
A more recent Idaho case which supports the same
proposition is directly on point. In Cedarholm v. State
Parm It-lutual Insurance Co1npanies and Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, 81 Idaho 143, 338 P.2d 93
(1959) , the Court was asked to decide whether or not an
insurer should be liable to the insured for a reasonable
attorney's fee when the insured is compelled to expend
attorney's fees to effect a recovery of funds claimed by
the insurer pursuant to subrogation provisions of its
policy. In this direct action by the insurer against the
insured, the Court held that the insured was liable to the
insurer for the amount of its subrogation rights, subject,
however, to a reduction by the amount expended by the
insured for collection of the funds. The Court cited the
following excerpt from Am. J ur. as the controlling
authority:

13
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"The general rule is that the insured may retain out of the funds recovered from the wrong·
doer, after the payment of the policy, the costs
a_nd reaso?able expenses. incurred in. the litiga·
tion, for 1t would be un1ust to reqmre him to
incur expenses. for the recovery of money for
the benefit of the insurer, without being allowed
to reimburse himself". 29 Am. J ur., Section 134(1
at page 1008.
In the case at bar, neither of the defendants would
admit liability, and respondent was forced to proceed
with legal action to recover for her injuries. As the ap·
pellant has stated in its Brief, the insurer is in a peculiar
position with respect to its insured' s status when the in·
sured may have a claim against it pursuant to the unin·
sured motorist provisions of its policy. In this situation,
the insurer has a conflict of interest, on one hand being
a plaintiff in the shoes of its insured by way of subroga·
tion, and on the other hand being a defendant in the
shoes of the uninsured motorist because of the uninsured
motorist coverage. For this reason, if the Court is
willing to allow the insurer setoff by way of subrogation
against payments due pursuant to uninsured motorist
coverage, the insurer should be liable to the insured for
a reasonable attorney's fee. That is certainly the case
in a situation where neither of the defendants are willing
to admit liability and the injured party is forced to
seek redress through litigation.

14
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CONCLUSION
A.micus Curiae respectfully submits that appellant
is and should be liable to respop.dent for the total face
amount of the uninsured motorist policy written by it
without setoff for medical payments made as a matter
of public policy. Furthermore, if appellant is allowed
setoff pursuant to its right of subrogation, appellant
should be liable to respondent for a reasonable attorney's
fee for the collection thereof. In light of the statutory
language of the Utah Uninsured Motorist Statute, in
no event should appell•nt be liable to respondent for less
than $10,000.00, without setoff in any manner whatso~
erer which might tend to reduce the statutory minimum.
Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD W. BURNINGHAM
DAVID B. DEE
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
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